"Die syrische Exil-Opposition ist eine Erfindung des Westens" Jürgen Todenhöfer SZ-online

Auch wenn man die politische Brille Todenhöfers nicht zu tragen bereit ist, so muss man doch konzidieren, dass er eine Stimme der Vernunft in der mit Hasspropaganda verminten Landschaft  verkörpert.

"Der Westen muss als Erstes Saudi-Arabien, aber auch Katar überzeugen und notfalls zwingen, die militärische und finanzielle Unterstützung extremistischer Rebellen einzustellen."

Jürgen Todenhöfer, 73, war in den 70er- und 80er-Jahren Sprecher der Unionsfraktion für Entwicklungs- und Rüstungskontrollpolitik. Später war er mehr als 20 Jahre Vorstand bei Burda. Seit Ausbruch der Kämpfe bereiste er Syrien sechs Mal.

voller Text:

Jürgen Todenhöfer zu Syrien: Verhandelt mit Assad! - Politik ...

www.sueddeutsche.de/.../syrien-und-der-westen-verhandelt-mit-assad-1.18...

Verhandelt mit Assad! Jürgen Todenhöfer SZ-online

Man muss Todenhöfers Urteil über den Präsidenten Assad nicht übernehmen, um zu begreifen, dass er mit  seiner Forderung recht hat und den politischen Realitäten  gerechter wird  als fast alle anderen Stimmen aus dem Westen. Im Grunde repräsentiert er das neue Kräfteverhältnis, das die US- Regierung zwingt zu verhandeln. In Davos sitzt der iranische Präsident Rohani als Ehrengast am Tisch, kurz zuvor wurde er noch aus Montreux verwiesen - ein Anachronismus.

Syrien und der WestenVerhandelt mit Assad!

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Szene aus dem zerstörten Aleppo: Der Westen muss mit Baschar al-Assad verhandeln. 

(Foto:REUTERS)

ANZEIGE

In Syrien haben religiöse Fanatiker das Lager der Rebellen übernommen. Al-Qaida ist die größere Gefahr als das alte Regime. Der Westen ist mitverantwortlich dafür, dass aus einem Terroristenhaufen eine schlagkräftige Armee wurde.

Ein Gastbeitrag von Jürgen Todenhöfer

Inzwischen dämmert es selbst führenden westlichen Politikern, dass sie sich in Syrien verrannt haben könnten, wie in Afghanistan, im Irak, in Libyen, ja fast überall im Nahen und Mittleren Osten. Der syrische Diktator Assad hatte wohl doch mehr Rückhalt im Volk, als die meisten westlichen "Experten" vorausgesagt hatten. Deshalb ist er, allen Prognosen zum Trotz, bis heute auch nicht gestürzt. Und die Rebellen kämpfen seit Langem mindestens genauso erbarmungslos, wie Assad das tut. Nach Auffassung des christlichen Patriarchen von Damaskus geht mindestens die Hälfte der Todesopfer auf ihr Konto, wie in den meisten Bürgerkriegen.

Der Westen hatte es ja angeblich gut gemeint, als er die anfangs unbestreitbar demokratischen Demonstranten in Syrien unterstützte. Verständnisvoll hatte er nach dem brutalen und unklugen Eingreifen des Regimes die Waffenlieferungen Saudi-Arabiens und Katars an die Aufständischen durchgewinkt. Dass die Demonstranten recht schnell von Extremisten beiseitegeschoben wurden, die dann ihrerseits von noch radikaleren Al-Qaida-Kämpfern verdrängt wurden, taten westliche Ferndiagnostiker als Verschwörungstheorie ab, zumindest aber als maßlose Übertreibung.

Syrien zerfällt

Inzwischen ist das Desaster jedoch unübersehbar. Syrien, einst Symbol des friedlichen Miteinanders der Religionen, zerbricht. Al-Qaida aber wird täglich stärker. In Afghanistan gab es 2001 gerade einmal einige hundert Al-Qaida-Kämpfer, im Irak 2006 waren es kaum mehr als tausend. In Syrien aber kämpfen inzwischen mehr als 25.000 Al- Qaida-Terroristen ihren unheiligen Krieg. Sie kämpfen nicht nur gegen Assad, sie kämpfen auch gegen andere Rebellengruppen und gegen Teile des Volkes.

Jürgen Todenhöfer zu Syrien: Verhandelt mit Assad! - Politik ...

www.sueddeutsche.de/.../syrien-und-der-westen-verhandelt-mit-assad-1.18...

Iran darf nach Davos aber nicht nach Montreux! Iran den den Friedensverhandlungen beteiligen!

Vor Rede von Irans Präsident in DavosRohani hält Freundschaft mit den USA für möglich

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pa)

ANZEIGE

"Feindseligkeiten in Freundschaft umwandeln": Irans Präsident Rohani sendet vor seiner Rede auf dem Weltwirtschaftsforum in der Schweiz positive Signale nach Washington. In Davos will er über "Irans Platz in der Welt" sprechen - wenige Stunden später wird einer seiner ärgsten Kritiker ans Rednerpult treten.

Vor seiner mit Spannung erwarteten Rede auf dem Weltwirtschaftsforum im Schweizer Ort Davos sendet der iranische Präsident Hassan Rohani positive Zeichen in Richtung Washington. Die seit mehr als drei Jahrzehnte dauernde Feindschaft zwischen den USA und dem Iran könnte sich nach den Worten Rohanis in eine Freundschaft wandeln.

In einem Interview mit dem öffentlichen Schweizer Fernsehen RTS sagte Rohani auf die Frage, ob die USA eines Tages wieder eine Botschaft in Teheran eröffnen könnten: "Keine Feindschaft dauert für immer, auch keine Freundschaft hält ewig. Also müssen wir Feindseligkeiten in Freundschaft umwandeln."

Zwar seien die Beziehungen zu den USA zuletzt schwierig gewesen. Doch mit harter Arbeit und gutem Willen auf beiden Seiten, könnten die Probleme überwunden werden. Der Iran reiche alle Ländern die Hand in Freundschaft und in Frieden, erklärte Rohani.

The Geopolitics of the Syrian Civil War By Reva Bhalla

Stratfor Geopolitical Weekly

Tuesday, January 21, 2014

By Reva Bhalla

International diplomats will gather Jan. 22 in the Swiss town of Montreux to hammer out a settlement designed to end Syria's three-year civil war. The conference, however, will be far removed from the reality on the Syrian battleground. Only days before the conference was scheduled to begin, a controversy threatened to engulf the proceedings after the United Nations invited Iran to participate, and Syrian rebel representatives successfully pushed for the offer to be rescinded. The inability to agree upon even who would be attending the negotiations is an inauspicious sign for a diplomatic effort that was never likely to prove very fruitful.

There are good reasons for deep skepticism. As Syrian President Bashar al Assad's forces continue their fight to recover ground against the increasingly fratricidal rebel forces, there is little incentive for the regime, heavily backed by Iran and Russia, to concede power to its sectarian rivals at the behest of Washington, especially when the United States is already negotiating with Iran. Ali Haidar, an old classmate of al Assad's from ophthalmology school and a long-standing member of Syria's loyal opposition, now serving somewhat fittingly as Syria's National Reconciliation Minister, captured the mood of the days leading up to the conference in saying "Don't expect anything from Geneva II. Neither Geneva II, not Geneva III nor Geneva X will solve the Syrian crisis. The solution has begun and will continue through the military triumph of the state."

Widespread pessimism over a functional power-sharing agreement to end the fighting has led to dramatic speculation that Syria is doomed either to break into sectarian statelets or, as Haidar articulated, revert to the status quo, with the Alawites regaining full control and the Sunnis forced back into submission. Both scenarios are flawed. Just as international mediators will fail to produce a power-sharing agreement at this stage of the crisis, and just as Syria's ruling Alawite minority will face extraordinary difficulty in gluing the state back together, there is also no easy way to carve up Syria along sectarian lines. A closer inspection of the land reveals why.

The Geopolitics of Syria

Before the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement traced out an awkward assortment of nation-states in the Middle East, the name Syria was used by merchants, politicians and warriors alike to describe a stretch of land enclosed by the Taurus Mountains to the north, the Mediterranean to the west, the Sinai Peninsula to the south and the desert to the east. If you were sitting in 18th-century Paris contemplating the abundance of cotton and spices on the other side of the Mediterranean, you would know this region as the Levant -- its Latin root "levare" meaning "to raise," from where the sun would rise in the east. If you were an Arab merchant traveling the ancient caravan routes in the Hejaz, or modern-day Saudi Arabia, facing the sunrise to the east, you would have referred to this territory in Arabic as Bilad al-Sham, or the "land to the left" of Islam's holy sites on the Arabian Peninsula.

Whether viewed from the east or the west, the north or the south, Syria will always find itself in an unfortunate position surrounded by much stronger powers. The rich, fertile lands straddling Asia Minor and Europe around the Sea of Marmara to the north, the Nile River Valley to the south and the land nestled between the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers to the east give rise to larger and more cohesive populations. When a power in control of these lands went roaming for riches farther afield, they inevitably came through Syria, where blood was spilled, races were intermixed, religions were negotiated and goods were traded at a frenzied and violent pace.

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Consequently, only twice in Syria's pre-modern history could this region claim to be a sovereign and independent state: during the Hellenistic Seleucid dynasty, based out of Antioch (the city of Antakya in modern-day Turkey) from 301 to 141 B.C., and during the Umayyad Caliphate, based out of Damascus, from A.D. 661 to 749. Syria was often divided or subsumed by its neighbors, too weak, internally fragmented and geographically vulnerable to stand its own ground. Such is the fate of a borderland.

Unlike the Nile Valley, Syria's geography lacks a strong, natural binding element to overcome its internal fissures. An aspiring Syrian state not only needs a coastline to participate in sea trade and guard against sea powers, but also a cohesive hinterland to provide food and security. Syria's rugged geography and patchwork of minority sects have generally been a major hindrance to this imperative.

Syria's long and extremely narrow coastline abruptly transforms into a chain of mountains and plateaus. Throughout this western belt, pockets of minorities, including Alawites, Christians and Druze, have sequestered themselves, equally distrustful of outsiders from the west as they are of local rulers to the east, but ready to collaborate with whomever is most likely to guarantee their survival. The long mountain barrier then descends into broad plains along the Orontes River Valley and the Bekaa Valley before rising sharply once again along the Anti-Lebanon range, the Hawran plateau and the Jabal al-Druze mountains, providing more rugged terrain for persecuted sects to hunker down and arm themselves.

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Just west of the Anti-Lebanon mountains, the Barada river flows eastward, giving rise to a desert oasis also known as Damascus. Protected from the coast by two mountain chains and long stretches of desert to the east, Damascus is essentially a fortress city and a logical place to make the capital. But for this fortress to be a capital worthy of regional respect, it needs a corridor running westward across the mountains to Mediterranean ports along the ancient Phoenician (or modern-day Lebanese) coast, as well as a northward route across the semi-arid steppes, through Homs, Hama and Idlib, to Aleppo.

The saddle of land from Damascus to the north is relatively fluid territory, making it an easier place for a homogenous population to coalesce than the rugged and often recalcitrant coastline. Aleppo sits alongside the mouth of the Fertile Crescent, a natural trade corridor between Anatolia to the north, the Mediterranean (via the Homs Gap) to the west and Damascus to the south. While Aleppo has historically been vulnerable to dominant Anatolian powers and can use its relative distance to rebel against Damascus from time to time, it remains a vital economic hub for any Damascene power.

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Finally, jutting east from the Damascus core lie vast stretches of desert, forming a wasteland between Syria and Mesopotamia. This sparsely populated route has long been traveled by small, nomadic bands of men -- from caravan traders to Bedouin tribesmen to contemporary jihadists -- with few attachments and big ambitions.

Demography by Design

The demographics of this land have fluctuated greatly, depending on the prevailing power of the time. Christians, mostly Eastern Orthodox, formed the majority in Byzantine Syria. The Muslim conquests that followed led to a more diverse blend of religious sects, including a substantial Shiite population. Over time, a series of Sunni dynasties emanating from Mesopotamia, the Nile Valley and Asia Minor made Syria the Sunni-majority region that it is today. While Sunnis came to heavily populate the Arabian Desert and the saddle of land stretching from Damascus to Aleppo, the more protective coastal mountains were meanwhile peppered with a mosaic of minorities. The typically cult-like minorities forged fickle alliances and were always on the lookout for a more distant sea power they could align with to balance against the dominant Sunni forces of the hinterland.

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The French, who had the strongest colonial links to the Levant, were masters of the minority manipulation strategy, but that approach also came with severe consequences that endure to this day. In Lebanon, the French favored Maronite Christians, who came to dominate Mediterranean sea trade out of bustling port cities such as Beirut at the expense of poorer Sunni Damascene merchants. France also plucked out a group known as the Nusayris living along the rugged Syrian coast, rebranded them as Alawites to give them religious credibility and stacked them in the Syrian military during the French mandate.

When the French mandate ended in 1943, the ingredients were already in place for major demographic and sectarian upheaval, culminating in the bloodless coup by Hafiz al Assad in 1970 that began the highly irregular Alawite reign over Syria. With the sectarian balance now tilting toward Iran and its sectarian allies, France's current policy of supporting the Sunnis alongside Saudi Arabia against the mostly Alawite regime that the French helped create has a tinge of irony to it, but it fits within a classic balance-of-power mentality toward the region.

Setting Realistic Expectations

The delegates discussing Syria this week in Switzerland face a series of irreconcilable truths that stem from the geopolitics that have governed this land since antiquity.

The anomaly of a powerful Alawite minority ruling Syria is unlikely to be reversed anytime soon. Alawite forces are holding their ground in Damascus and steadily regaining territory in the suburbs. Lebanese militant group Hezbollah is meanwhile following its sectarian imperative to ensure the Alawites hold onto power by defending the traditional route from Damascus through the Bekaa Valley to the Lebanese coast, as well as the route through the Orontes River Valley to the Alawite Syrian coast. So long as the Alawites can hold Damascus, there is no chance of them sacrificing the economic heartland.

It is thus little wonder that Syrian forces loyal to al Assad have been on a northward offensive to retake control of Aleppo. Realizing the limits to their own military offensive, the regime will manipulate Western appeals for localized cease-fires, using a respite in the fighting to conserve its resources and make the delivery of food supplies to Aleppo contingent on rebel cooperation with the regime. In the far north and east, Kurdish forces are meanwhile busy trying to carve out their own autonomous zone against mounting constraints, but the Alawite regime is quite comfortable knowing that Kurdish separatism is more of a threat to Turkey than it is to Damascus at this point.

The fate of Lebanon and Syria remain deeply intertwined. In the mid-19th century, a bloody civil war between Druze and Maronites in the densely populated coastal mountains rapidly spread from Mount Lebanon to Damascus. This time around, the current is flowing in reverse, with the civil war in Syria now flooding Lebanon. As the Alawites continue to gain ground in Syria with aid from Iran and Hezbollah, a shadowy amalgam of Sunni jihadists backed by Saudi Arabia will become more active in Lebanon, leading to a steady stream of Sunni-Shiite attacks that will keep Mount Lebanon on edge.

The United States may be leading the ill-fated peace conference to reconstruct Syria, but it doesn't really have any strong interests there. The depravity of the civil war itself compels the United States to show that it is doing something constructive, but Washington's core interest for the region at the moment is to preserve and advance a negotiation with Iran. This goal sits at odds with a publicly stated U.S. goal to ensure al Assad is not part of a Syrian transition, and this point may well be one of many pieces in the developing bargain between Washington and Tehran. However, al Assad holds greater leverage so long as his main patron is in talks with the United States, the only sea power currently capable of projecting significant force in the eastern Mediterranean.

Egypt, the Nile Valley power to the south, is wholly ensnared in its own internal problems. So is Turkey, the main power to the north, which is now gripped in a public and vicious power struggle that leaves little room for Turkish adventurism in the Arab world. That leaves Saudi Arabia and Iran as the main regional powers able to directly manipulate the Syrian sectarian battleground. Iran, along with Russia, which shares an interest in preserving relations with the Alawites and thus its access to the Mediterranean, will hold the upper hand in this conflict, but the desert wasteland linking Syria to Mesopotamia is filled with bands of Sunni militants eager for Saudi backing to tie down their sectarian rivals.

And so the fighting will go on. Neither side of the sectarian divide is capable of overwhelming the other on the battlefield and both have regional backers that will fuel the fight. Iran will try to use its relative advantage to draw the Saudi royals into a negotiation, but a deeply unnerved Saudi Arabia will continue to resist as long as Sunni rebels still have enough fight in them to keep going. Fighters on the ground will regularly manipulate appeals for cease-fires spearheaded by largely disinterested outsiders, all while the war spreads deeper into Lebanon. The Syrian state will neither fragment and formalize into sectarian statelets nor reunify into a single nation under a political settlement imposed by a conference in Geneva. A mosaic of clan loyalties and the imperative to keep Damascus linked to its coastline and economic heartland -- no matter what type of regime is in power in Syria -- will hold this seething borderland together, however tenuously.

 

The Geopolitics of the Syrian Civil War | Stratfor

Peinlich: Iran wieder ausgeladen - Syrische Delegation nach ungeplantem Stopp unterwegs nach Genf

Syrische Delegation nach ungeplantem Stopp unterwegs nach Genf

21. Jänner 2014, 16:29

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  UN-Generalsekretär Ban Ki-moon hat den Iran wieder von den Friedensgesprächen zu Syrien ausgeladen.
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  Hassan Rohani mit Ban Ki-moon.
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Betankung wegen EU-Embargos verweigert - Iran ausgeladen - Opposition drohte zuvor mit Boykott des Treffens

Damaskus/Washington/Athen - Die syrische Regierungsdelegation für die Friedenskonferenz in Montreux ist nach einem fünfstündigen Zwischenaufenthalt auf dem Athener Flughafen am Dienstag in Richtung Schweiz gestartet.  In dem Ort am Genfer See soll am Mittwoch die internationale Syrien-Konferenz beginnen.

• MEHR ZUM THEMA

Zuvor hatte es von syrischer Seite geheißen, die griechischen Behörden hätten sich geweigert, das Delegationsflugzeug zu betanken. Dagegen hatte ein Sprecher der griechischen Zivilluftfahrt in Athen gesagt, das Flugzeug werde überprüft, außerdem sei kein Flugplan unterbreitet worden.

Die griechische Firma, die für die Treibstoffversorgung zuständig ist, habe das Auftanken unter Verweis auf ein geltendes Handelsembargo der EU verweigert, gab Vassilis Alevizopoulos von der Gewerkschaft der Flughafenarbeiter bekannt.

Iran ausgeladen

Die zweite Syrien-Friedenskonferenz wird ohne Iran beginnen. Nach heftiger Kritik lud UNO-Generalsekretär Ban Ki-moon den Iran von den am Mittwoch beginnenden Gesprächen aus. Die syrische Opposition sagte daraufhin ihre Teilnahme zu. Für den russischen Außenminister Sergej Lawrow ist die Ausladung ein "Fehler".

Zuvor hatte die Opposition angekündigt, sie werde nicht an der Konferenz teilnehmen, sollte Ban die Einladung an Teheran nicht zurücknehmen. Kurz nachdem die syrische Nationalallianz ihr Kommen zur Konferenz zugesagt hatte, erklärte die größte Gruppe innerhalb der Exilopposition, der syrische Nationalrat, am späten Montagabend, sie werde aus der Koalition ausscheiden. Der Chef des syrischen Nationalrates, George Sabra, wurde von arabischen Medien mit den Worten zitiert: "Wir haben es schon vorher gesagt, wenn die Koalition an Genf II teilnimmt, werden wir nicht in der Gruppe bleiben."

USA begrüßen Entscheidung der UNO

Die USA begrüßten die Entscheidung Bans. Die Sprecherin des US-Außenministeriums, Jen Psaki, erklärte, alle Parteien könnten sich jetzt auf die Arbeit konzentrieren, die darin bestehe, das Leiden des syrischen Volkes zu beenden und den lange überfälligen Prozess eines politischen Übergangs zu beginnen.

Ban sei "zutiefst enttäuscht", dass der Iran sich entgegen vorherigen Zusagen am Montag nicht offiziell zu den Grundlagen und Zielen der Konferenz bekannt habe. "Angesichts der Tatsache, dass der Iran sich entschieden hat, außerhalb der grundlegenden Vereinbarungen zu bleiben, hat Ban entschieden, dass das eintägige Treffen in Montreux ohne die Teilnahme Irans abgehalten wird."

Die am Sonntag kurzfristig ausgesprochene Einladung für den Iran hatte zuvor für heftige Kritik gesorgt und die internationale Friedenskonferenz sogar ganz infrage gestellt. Die syrische Opposition hatte die Einladung partout nicht akzeptieren wollen. Auch in Washington hatte nach einem Bericht der "New York Times" die Erwartung geherrscht, dass der Iran wieder ausgeladen werde. Teheran ist einer der letzten engen Verbündeten des Regimes des syrischen Präsidenten.

USA: Keine Mindestgrundlage für Teilnahme gegeben

Washington kritisierte, dass der Iran die Genfer Vereinbarungen zu Syrien "nicht öffentlich und voll unterstützt" habe. Entsprechend zitierte die "New York Times" am Montag einen Vertreter des US-Außenministeriums. "Der Iran hat noch nicht seine Bereitschaft gezeigt, sich ausdrücklich und öffentlich der vollen Umsetzung des Genf-I-Dokuments zu verschreiben, das eine Mindestgrundlage für die Teilnahme am Friedensprozess ist", sagte die US-Botschafterin bei den Vereinten Nationen, Samantha Power, am Montagmorgen (Ortszeit) im Sicherheitsrat.

Das Genf-I-Dokument vom Juni 2012 ist die Grundlage der Friedensgespräche, die am Mittwoch in Montreux beginnen und dann in Genf fortgesetzt werden sollen. Es sieht einen Waffenstillstand, die Freilassung von politischen Häftlingen und die Bildung einer Übergangsregierung unter Beteiligung der Opposition vor.

Die Beteiligung des Iran an den Verhandlungen war seit Wochen ein Streitpunkt zwischen den Unterstützern des Assad-Regimes und seinen Gegnern. 

Kritik aus Moskau, Enttäuschung in Teheran

Russlands Außenminister Lawrow hat die Ausladung des Iran als "Fehler" kritisiert. "Es ist aber keine Katastrophe", sagte Lawrow am Dienstag in Moskau vor Journalisten. "Ich bedauere, dass diese ganze Geschichte nicht zur Autorität der Organisation der Vereinten Nationen beiträgt", sagte Lawrow. Gegen die iranische Teilnahme an der Konferenz hätten sich die Teile der Opposition gewehrt, die einen Regimewechsel in Syrien anstreben, sagte Lawrow. Die russisch-amerikanische Initiative zur Lösung des Konflikts in Syrien sehe aber keine vorherigen Vereinbarungen oder Bedingungen vor. "Iran sollte eine wichtige Rolle spielen", sagte Lawrow.

Die Führung in Teheran hat enttäuscht auf die Entscheidung von Ban Ki-moon reagiert. "Die Ausladung erfolgte wohl unter politischem Druck und war daher ein sehr bedauerlicher und enttäuschender Schritt", sagte Außenamtssprecherin Marsieh Afcham am Dienstag. Der Iran habe sich nie aufgedrängt, stets einen klaren Standpunkt vertreten und zu keiner Zeit irgendwelche Vorbedingungen akzeptiert. Daher seien auch die Gründe für die Ausladung definitiv andere als die vom Generalsekretär erwähnten, so die Sprecherin auf einer Pressekonferenz. (APA, 21.1.2014)

Der Standard

Who is in the Driver’s Seat before Geneva-II

Wayne MADSEN | 21.01.2014 | 00:00

Unquestionably, there would be no Geneva-II conference on Syria had it not been for Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s brilliant tactical strategy of offering up a positive proposal from Syrian President Bashar al-Assad that Syria would turn over to the West all of his country’s chemical weapons in order to avoid a Western military attack. Kerry laid down his chemical weapons stipulation at a September 2013 joint press conference in London with British Foreign Secretary William Hague. In answer to a reporter’s question about what Assad could do or offer in order to stop an attack from the United States and other NATO forces, Kerry responded, “Umm... sure, he could turn over every single bit of his chemical weapons to the international community in the next week. Turn it over! All of them... without delay and allow a full and total accounting for that. But he isn’t about to do it and it can’t be done, obviously.” Kerry’s voice drowned out in his last sentence because he knew he had stepped in a huge pile of barnyard excrement. It is now obvious that Kerry was worried that if Assad did what Kerry thought was impossible and actually agreed to turn over Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile, there would be no Western military attack on Syria because the casus belli imposed by the United States would have been removed from the table. Lavrov quickly responded to Kerry’s half-hearted and non-serious ultimatum by announcing Assad’s acceptance of Kerry’s terms. Kerry was then forced to meet with Lavrov in Geneva where Russia and the United States agreed to a framework for chemical weapons disarmament by Syria. Unlike Kerry, who has never served as a diplomat in the field, Lavrov is a seasoned diplomat, having served the Soviet Union in Sri Lanka, mastering the Sinhala language, and working for the Russian Foreign Ministry in a variety of positions, including UN ambassador. Lavrov was a natural to be an envoy to majority Buddhist Sri Lanka, having previously worked in the majority Buddhist autonomous Russian Republic of Tuva. Critics of Kerry who worked on his 2004 presidential campaign argue that if Kerry spent more time worried about his campaign than in his hair style, he would have defeated George W. Bush. The shock waves that the planned military attack on Syria was on hold rippled through the ranks of the rebel Syrian National Council (SNC) in Istanbul and government corridors of power in the pro-war capitals of Ankara, Riyadh, Doha, Paris, and Jerusalem. Lavrov and Russian President Vladimir Putin could claim credit for bringing the Middle East from the edge of war to the peace table.  The Geneva-II conference, which will actually be held in Montreux, Switzerland, follows the Geneva-I conference held under the auspices of the United Nations Action Group on Syria in June 2012. That conference, chaired by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, agreed to a transitional government for Syria composed of members of the Syrian opposition and the Syrian government. Geneva-II was scheduled to have taken place in July 2013 but was postponed until September. Syria had been under pressure from the Mohamed Morsi government in Egypt, as well as from Turkey, to take part in the Geneva-I and make important concessions to the opposition. Making matters worse for Syria was the rejection by the Western powers of Iran’s participation in the talks. Syria, except for the support of Russia, would be all alone. With the ouster of Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood government from power in Cairo by the pro-Syrian Egyptian military and Lavrov’s and Assad’s stunning acceptance of Kerry’s ultimatum to trade a military attack for an agreement by Syria to gibe up its chemical weapons, Damascus witnessed an immediate reversal of fortune in its favor. With the overthrow of Morsi, Assad triumphantly declared the end of political Islam as a potent force in the Middle East. Syria’s own Qatar-supported Muslim Brotherhood faction inside the rebel coalition was eclipsed by the even more radical Saudi-supported Salafists with Al Qaeda and other radical groups. Assad was dealt another fortunate hand on June 25, 2013, when Qatar’s Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani, abdicated in favor of his son, Tamim bin Hamad al Thani. Almost immediately, Tamim began to withdraw Qatari support for the Muslim Brotherhood. The new emir gave the Brotherhood’s spiritual leader, Sheikh Yusuf al Qaradawi, 48 hours to leave Qatar. Tamim also began to turn off the spigot of Qatari funds for the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. The Syrian rebels were dealt another head-spinning blow.  Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan also began to face significant internal opposition. Turkey’s support for the Syrian rebels also began to wane, especially after Syrian rebel actions inside of Turkey. At about the same time, there were strong indications that its was Saudi-supported Syrian radical Islamists who launched a deadly chemical attack in Ghouta, near Damascus on August 21. The Western powers and much of the corporate global media attempted to pin the attack on Assad, increasing support for an American and NATO military attack on Syria. The hidden hand of Saudi intelligence and Saudi Arabia’s top spy, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, was seen behind the Ghouta attack and similar chemical weapons attacks by Saudi-supplied and financed Salafist rebels both Syria and Iraq. With reports coming out of the civil war fronts of heinously vicious attacks by Salafist Jabhat al Nusra, Taqfiri, Al Qaeda, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant/al-Sham (ISIL/ISIS) radicals on minority Alawites, Christians, Kurds, Druze, and Shi’as in Syria, including reports of guerrillas funded by the West of eating the organs of their victims, there was a stand-down in the provision of armaments to the rebel side by the Western powers. The large influx of pro-rebel mercenaries into Syria from countries like France, Britain, the United States, Canada, Belgium, Spain, Sweden, and Germany also alarmed Western countries. There was a fear that after Western citizens fighting for the Syrian rebels were victorious in Syria, they would turn their attention to Europe and North America in a manner similar to the attacks by Al Qaeda on the West following the establishment of Taliban rule in Afghanistan. Elements of the pro-Western Free Syrian Army began to engage in bitter combat with the Saudi-supplied Salafist and Muslim Brotherhood forces. While the rebels fought each other, Assad’s forces were able to regain control of much of the country, save for areas along the Turkish border and a few pockets around Damascus and other Syrian cities. The failure of the United States to attack Syria, coupled with the later outreach by Washington to Iran and the opening of direct bilateral talks between the two nations, also chilled relations between Washington and Saudi Arabia. Prince Bandar was no longer seen by Washington as a trustworthy partner, especially after his reported offer to President Putin of calling off Al Qaeda and Salafist attacks on the Winter Olympics in Sochi in return for Russia’s abandonment of support for Assad. The Saudi offer was rejected by Moscow.  News of the proposal provided further evidence of the links between the Saudis and Al Qaeda attacks around the world, including the presence of 15 Saudi nationals among the 19 alleged 9/11 terrorists. Because Assad’s situation on the ground in Syria was much improved from a year before, the Syrian National Council almost voted to accept participation in Geneva-II. Some SNC members voted against joining Geneva-II, hoping instead for continued Western pressure to have Assad unconditionally leave office. However, the West opposed the rejectionist front and strong-armed the SNC into joining the Geneva-II talks. The West, in return, opposed any role in Syria for Assad in a transitional government and continued to try to freeze Iran out of the talks. However, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon invited Iran to participate in Geneva-II and Iran accepted. It is clear that Assad, before Geneva-II, is in his strongest position since the outbreak of the Syrian rebellion. The rebels agreed to a cease fire in Aleppo and an exchange of prisoners with Damascus. A year earlier, any such agreement with the Assad government by the rebels would have been rejected out-of-hand. In the week before the commencement of the January 22 Geneva-II talks, Assad is in the driver’s seat. To the contrary of what the United States and the other Western powers want, Assad will continue to play a dominant role in Syrian political life, merely because of his own tenacity and the total collapse of the anti-Assad coalition…  COLUMNISTS on "Strategic Culture Foundation"

Tags: UN Middle East Russia Syria US Kerry Lavrov

Syrian Government Not Responsible for Ghouta Chemical Attack: Experts Say

Syrian Government Not Responsible for Ghouta Chemical Attack: Experts Say

Posted on 01/17/14 at 19:44

A series of revelations about the chemical attack in Syria’s eastern Ghouta is doubting US accusation that the Syrian government has launched the gas assault. A team of US experts meeting this week in Washington, concluded that the rocket that delivered sarin to a Damascus suburb last summer could not have been fired from the Syrian government positions. They said that the range of the rocket that delivered sarin in the largest attack that Gas masksnight was too short for the device to have been fired from the Syrian government positions where the Obama administration insists they originated. Separately, international weapons experts are puzzling over why the rocket in question — an improvised 330 mm to 350 mm rocket equipped with a large receptacle on its nose to hold chemicals — reportedly did not appear in the Syrian government’s declaration of its arsenal to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and apparently was not uncovered by OPCW inspectors who believe they have destroyed Syria’s ability to deliver a chemical attack. The authors of a report released Wednesday said that their study of the rocket’s design, its likely payload and its possible trajectories show that it would have been impossible for the rocket to have been fired from inside areas controlled by the Syrian government. In the report, “Possible Implications of Faulty U.S. Technical Intelligence,” Richard Lloyd, a former United Nations weapons inspector, and Theodore Postol, a professor of science, technology and national security policy at the Massachusetts Institute ... Read More » on Syrianews